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Bailing Out: 
Internal versus External Convertibility 
In the previous chapter we discussed the evolution of the Argentine financial 
system before and after the First World War. The  various diagnostic tests that 
we performed suggested the system was in relatively poor shape throughout the 
interwar period, but it is the aim of this chapter to point out the critical juncture 
at which the collapse of the system seemed perilously close. To understand this 
turn of events, we rely on the often overlooked distinction between external and 
internal convertibility. 
From 1914 until 1927, Argentina’s currency was inconvertible; the window 
of the Conversion Office was, so to speak, closed. Thus, the national gold stock 
was safe, and no external drain (a conversion of notes to specie) could take place. 
Ips0 facto, there could therefore be no conversion of deposits to specie either, so 
that an internal drain was temporarily ruled out by the inconvertible currency. 
A key question for Argentine policymakers as they contemplated rejoining 
the gold standard in the late 1920s-although  it is anyone’s guess as to whether 
they considered this possibility-was  whether this stable state of affairs would 
still prevail if convertibility were resumed. That is, if some adverse shocks hit 
the macroeconomy or the banking sector, or both, could the system be subject 
to a “meltdown” scenario, with a run on both the banks and the currency board 
itself? To address this question, we must examine whether the banking system 
maintained  the same sound inside-money  practices that enabled the prewar 
convertibility regime to function so well. 
With the wisdom of hindsight, we employ a simple model and econometric 
test to show that unsound practices led to an unstable outcome in 1927-29.  Our 
finding helps account for the fleeting two-year convertibility period 1927-29 
and the sudden demise of the interwar gold standard in Argentina.  Since this 
kind of experience was not unique to Argentina, the approach also has wider 
ramifications for other currency and banking crises under fixed exchange rates, 
both in the Great Depression and in recent years. 
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Crises-Internal  and External 
In the wake of recent developing-country macroeconomic-financial crises, one 
of the more pressing questions confronting researchers and policymakers has 
been to discover what kind of money and banking regime might be optimal for 
a small open economy.’ The problem is of course acute in the context of a fixed 
exchange-rate regime, a system usually motivated by a desire to dampen external 
price volatility or discipline domestic monetary and fiscal policy in the wake of 
hyperinflationary experience. Such regimes can take a variety of forms, such as 
a discretionary central bank adhering to a peg or a more rigid institution such 
as a currency board with hard rules designed to “tie the hands.” Whatever the 
form, the key dilemma of the money-banking nexus is never far away: how can 
goals of external convertibility (a fixed exchange rate) and internal convertibility 
(a working fractional-reserve banking system) be simultaneously met? 
As is well known, problems in both macroeconomic and financial areas can 
strike together, the so-called “twin crises,” and the exact causal relationship be- 
tween the two remains an area for research.‘ Recent events powerfully demon- 
strated this type of dynamic in an era of globalization, and the combination of 
pegged rates and weak banking systems is now seen as a major cause of the Asian 
crises of 1997-98.  However, noting the contrast to the fragile exchange-rate 
regimes that just collapsed, some observers now advocate one type of institu- 
tional innovation that seemed to weather all of the recent storms. The Hong 
Kong Currency Board and the Argentine Convertibility Plan apparently coped 
well with a dismal international financial situation and are under study as pos- 
sible models for more robust designs in other countries. Can these schemes be 
a basis for a monetary and financial design that will function well in this kind of 
global economic environment? We think a combination of theory and history 
can provide some answers. 
From a historical perspective we note that the late-nineteenth  and early- 
twentieth century experience of the periphery has much in common with the 
current situation.  Emerging markets on the periphery were joining the ever- 
expanding markets of the core, there was widespread use of a fixed exchange-rate 
system, and fledgling banking systems were learning how to function in this 
new environment. In our study of Argentine history we find that the present 
types of problems have earlier ancestors in the turbulent interwar economy. 
1. In the Asian crises of 1997-98  considerable difficulty was caused by a weak financial sector in 
general, and, specifically, the large number of insolvent banks that had been propped up for 
many years in an environment of lax regulation and supervision. At the time of crisis, the size 
of bad assets in the financial sector threatened either to destroy the entire superstructure for 
intermediation, or else require substantial subsidies to cover the large gaps between true assets 
and liabilities.  In countries like Korea and Indonesia, a very large clean up of the banking 
sector was precipitated, requiring considerable real resources.  For a discussion of the recent 
crises and the relationship between banking sector weaknesses and macroeconomic crisis, see 
Eichengreen (1999), Roubini (n.d.b), and World Bank (1999). 
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More important, we find that the Argentine institutional structure in money 
and banking changed considerably in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
as did its vulnerability. 
Ifwe are to analyze this historical episode from a theoretical perspective, we 
need to turn to a set of models that integrate banking and financial crises into 
models of currency crisis. However, the so-called first- and second-generation 
models of currency crisis finessed the distinction between inside and outside 
money and the banking sector was excluded from the analysis? More recently, 
and motivated in part by the contours of recent crises, scholars have turned 
their attention to the problem of twin crises-that  is, the internal and external 
convertibility problem. This embryonic literature draws on ideas found in some 
vintage papers in the literature, notably the work of Diaz Alejandro, but the 
theoretical base is still being developed with close attention  to how we can 
best match the empirical regularities4 In that spirit, we draw on an older and 
somewhat neglected model of the money-banking  nexus by Dornbusch and 
Frenkel, an approach they applied to an even more distant historical situation? 
The Dornbusch-Frenkel  theory was  developed to illustrate the short-run 
dynamics of the gold standard regime and the operations of the Bank of Eng- 
land in the crisis of 1847. This elegant model addressed the actions of two 
quasi-independent parts of the Bank the Issue Department and the Banking 
Department. The former was concerned with outside money, the paper note 
issue and its gold backing; the latter dealt with inside money, and engaged 
in normal commercial banking operations, yet it also had a special role as the 
banker to the state, being responsible for handling government debt. The  model 
traces the dynamics of gold backing for the currency (subject to externuldruin) 
and the backing of banking deposits by reserves (subject to internal drain). 
This approach is notable for its multiple equilibrium possibilities. There can 
be a stable “good equilibrium” with high reserve ratios and a high gold stock in a 
strong banking environment where neither internal nor external drain threaten 
the system. There can also be an unstable “bad equilibrium” with low reserve 
ratios and a tendency to banking collapse with full internal-and  possibly some 
external-drain.  In the former equilibrium, confidence in the bank runs high, 
and an interest-rate  defense is feasible, but in the latter case confidence is so 
low that an interest-rate defense is self-defeating and the drain only increases. 
3. In early currency-crisis models a fixed exchange rate collapsed when money printing was used 
to finance a fiscal gap (Krugman 1979). In later models, self-fulfilling crises were also shown 
to be possible, where external markets punish a good borrower and the withdrawal of capital 
leads to collapse (Obstfeld 1994; 1996). 
4.  Diaz Alejandro (1985b). For a survey of the issues see Eichengreen (1998). Theoretical work 
includes papers by Velasco (1987) and Calvo (1996; 1998). A key empirical  contribution is the 
paper by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
5. Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984).  In a recent  important contribution, Miller (1996) refines 
and expands  the Dornbusch-Frenkel model, incorporating a Krugman-style approach to  a 
speculative attack and incorporating forward-looking expectations. 168  Straining at the Anchor 
We  think the applicability of this model to the Argentine situation in the 
years 1900-1935 is clear:  the currency board, the Conversion Office, was the 
analog of the Issue Department,  and the quasi-state bank, the Banco de la 
Nacion Argentina (BNA), functioned just like the Banking Department. The 
two  were linked to the same public-sector balance sheet in the sense that they 
were both government agencies and, in practice, the Conversion Office was 
eventually called on to make rediscounts to the state bank to keep it afloat. 
That is, the state bank (and possibly some of the big private banks) received ex 
post-and  quite possibly expected ex ante-implicit  state guarantees via a de 
facto banking insurance provision. 
What are the implications of our analysis? At one level, there are general 
implications for the study of the interwar period and the demise of the gold 
standard. We know a great deal about outside money in this era: much has been 
written about monetary authorities, the impact of the trilemma, and political- 
economy issues. Yet we know much less about inside money: the role of the 
financial sector as a possible source of regime inconsistency is less understood. 
If the lessons of the Argentine experience can be applied to other countries’ 
histories then we  might get a better  sense of the conflicts between money 
and banking regimes in the 1920s and 1930s, and a clearer view of the slender 
tightrope on which policymakers  were poised. This could yield a more nuanced 
explanation ofwhat many see as a still largely unanswered puzzle: why the gold 
standard, a system that had functioned so well before 1914,was sudden1y“unsafe 
for use” in the 1920s. 
At a narrower level, our work has direct implications for the institutional 
design of money and banking regimes. Suppose a fixed exchange-rate, or exter- 
nal convertible, regime is credible. Our paper suggests that commercial banks 
can be in a permanently sustainable situationfor sure only if they specialize in 
administering the means of payment of the economy-that  is, if they become 
narrow banks. Such specialization would leave riskier banking activity to other 
uninsured institutions such as investment houses and merchant banks (Fama 
1985). This might be the only design in which one can attain the goals of both 
external and internal convertibility even under a very bad state of  nature. 
Simply put, under the traditional  design of a gold-exchange standard  (or 
currency board) and a banking regime you can only “price”  outside money-but 
not banking deposits, the main component of inside money.  In the event of 
a crisis of confidence, such as a Diamond-Dybvig run on deposits, the system 
might end up being governed by the dynamics of a bad (unstable) equilibrium 
from which there is no e~cape.~  Such dynamics would destroy internal and 
6. Some references works on the interwar period and its long-run context are Eichengreen and 
Sachs (1985); Eichengreen (1992a; 1992b; 1996);Temin (1989). The  quoted phrase isTemin’s. 
7. Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Bailing Out  169 
external convertibility alike, taking down the institutions of both-the  currency 
board and the banks-with  it. 
To sum up, having a strong and credible currency board may be no defense 
against a crisis if the banking sector is rotten and a nasty shock occurs. This 
sentiment has been often expressed in policymalung circles in the wake of the 
recent crises, especially by those who reject the idea of currency boards as a uni- 
versal panacea8 Still researchers seek more empirical support for the argument, 
and, given that the debate rages on, we think there is value in having explored 
the problem here with a more formal, theoretical, and empirical treatment. 
The  Argentine Banking Environment  and Its Evolution 
As  we noted in earlier chapters, after the catastrophic crisis in 1890-91  the 
government took great care in designing a new regime to replace the fragile 
decentralized system of the past. It was hoped that a new money and banking 
regime would usher in an era of stability sufficient to permit Argentina to rejoin 
the gold standard. Two institutions were central to the plan. The first was the 
currency board: for the first time the state centralized the power to issue money 
within the new Conversion Office. The second was the newly reformed state 
bank The Banco Nacional was liquidated during the Baring financial crisis in 
1891  and was refounded as the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina in 1891. The two 
institutions were kept at arm’s length so as to effectively isolate two functions. 
External convertibility was to be the sole task of the conversion office. Internal 
convertibilitywas the domain of the Banco de la Naci6n and the private financial 
system. 
The new state bank had multiple roles as the financial agent of the state, a 
development bank, and as one of the biggest commercial banks. Could it handle 
all these tasks safely? A new charter was put in place governing bank reserves 
at the Banco de la Nacion  so as to limit its rediscounting capacity.  Despite 
being seemingly “too big to fail,” and clearly susceptible to the moral hazard 
risks that attach to any banking institution with implicit state guarantees, the 
Banco de la Nacion maintained an admirably clean balance sheet in the period 
of recovery and smooth economic growth from 1892 to 1913 (Table 8.1). As 
a fraction of overall banking activity, its use of rediscounts was small even after 
a relaxation of banking laws in 1904; nonperforming loans were few; leverage 
was not excessive and there appeared to be adequate capital on the balance sheet 
(Figure 8.1). The  reserve-deposit ratios stayed very high, well over 50 percent 
in most years before the war (Figure 8.2). 
8. For a discussion of recent issues in banking structure to prevent crises, see, for example, the 
“Economics Focus” discussion of narrow banks  and  subordinated debt ideas (‘‘Better than 
Basle,” The Economist, June 19,1999). On the role of currency boards as incomplete insurance 
against crisis, see, for example Gavin and Hausmann (1998) and Feldstein (1999). For a more 
trenchant critique of currency boards see Roubini (n.d.a). Table 8.1. Banco de la Nacidn, Balance Sheet Items, 1892-1 934 
Loans  Liabilities  Ratios 
Total Ldisc  To  Non-  Banking Reserves  Cap-  Dep-  Redisc. on-Pe: Capital 
Year  Govt.  Perf.  Total Gold  Paper  ital  osits  to Loano Loanto Loan: 
1892  33  0  -  0  22  1  21  50  37  0.00  0.01  1.52 
1893  46  0  -  1  52  5  47  50  57  0.00  0.01  1.09 
1894  51  0  -  1  49  1  47  50  57  0.00  0.02  0.98 
1895  56  0  -  1  46  2  44  50  58  0.00  0.02  0.89 
1896  68  0  -  1  39  2  37  50  58  0.00  0.01  0.74 
1897  72  0  -  1  40  3  37  50  59  0.00  0.02  0.69 
1898  74  0  -  1  48  3  45  50  67  0.00  0.01  0.68 
1899  81  0  -  1  45  3  43  50  72  0.00  0.01  0.62 
1900  87  0  -  1  63  18  44  50  77  0.00  0.02  0.57 
1901  88  0  -  2  68  25  43  50  78  0.00  0.02  0.57 
1902  80  0  -  2  62  19  43  50  80  0.00  0.03  0.63 
1903  78  0  -  2  99  34  66  50  111  0.00  0.02  0.64 
1904  98  0  -  1  97  49  47  50  124  0.00  0.01  0.51 
1905  166  1  -  1  77  26  51  52  152  0.01  0.00  0.31 
1906  178  3  -  1  74  21  52  54  144  0.02  0.00  0.30 
1907  222  1  -  1  97  42  55  107  173  0.00  0.01  0.48 
1908  254  3  -  2  119  52  68  110  246  0.01  0.01  0.43 
1909  302  3  -  2  182  79  103  113  347  0.01  0.01  0.38 
1910  367  4  -  3  177  83  94  117  391  0.01  0.01  0.32 
1911  415  6  -  5  217  77  139  121  413  0.01  0.01  0.29 
1912  433  9  -  9  253  86  168  125  478  0.02  0.02  0.29 
1913  496  8  -  14  259  73  186  128  541  0.02  0.03  0.26 
1914  541  43  -  41  386  65  321  128  605  0.08  0.08  0.24 
1915  504  13  -  57  386  23  362  128  692  0.03  0.11  0.25 
1916  503  16  -  59  401  34  367  128  756  0.03  0.12  0.25 
1917  583  7  72  47  380  84  296  129  871  0.01  0.08  0.22 
1918  905  5  411  32  398  82  315  132  1,195  0.01  0.04  0.15 
1919 1,064  32  361  24  357  89  268  139  1,250  0.03  0.02  0.13 
1920 1,162  29  338  18  462  56  406  145  1,412  0.03  0.02  0.12 
1921 1,074  38  148  20  463  53  410  150  1,310  0.04  0.02  0.14 
1922 1,225  13  151  35  392  53  340  152  1,396  0.01  0.03  0.12 
1923 1,369  107  153  49  326  29  296  152  1,479  0.08  0.04  0.11 
1924 1,436  122  154  45  283  19  264  153  1,503  0.08  0.03  0.11 
1925 1,386  123  85  36  333  35  298  144  1,499  0.09  0.03  0.10 
1926 1,398  147  87  73  355  35  320  157  1,533  0.11  0.05  0.11 
1927 1,330  106  76  75  482  161  321  158  1,621  0.08  0.06  0.12 
1928 1,336  92  70  99  596  318  278  161  1,749  0.07  0.07  0.12 
1929 1,557  156  71  92  262  68  193  162  1,665  0.10  0.06  0.10 
1930 1,573  152  67  99  228  3  225  163  1,657  0.10  0.06  0.10 
1931 1,724  285  94  117  246  2  243  164  1,457  0.17  0.07  0.10 
1932 1,687  316  95  158  261  2  259  165  1,498  0.19  0.09  0.10 
1933 1,686  293  336  183  256  2  254  165  1,578  0.17  0.11  0.10 
1934 1,669  295  349  182  189  0  189  165  1,565  0.18  0.11  0.10 
Notes: Units are millions of paper pesos, except ratios.  Data are end-of-year.  Gold pesos are 
converted at market rates before 1899 and at parity of 2.27 after 1899. Before 1905, capital is 
book value. 
Sources: Appendix 1  and balance sheets of Banco de la Naci6n. Bailing Out 
Figure 8.1. Banco de la Nacion Balance Sheet, 1892-1934 
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Notes and sources: See Table 8.1 
The system worked well, and a clean separation of the two functions was 
maintained until the crisis of 1913-14 when an emergency rediscount law was 
enacted. The dimension of the crisis cannot be overstated: this was by far the 
biggest recession in Argentine history, and the cumulative loss of output during 
the trough exceeded such losses in the Baring Crisis and the Great Depression. 
Real activity slumped and the financial sector consequences were dramatic. 
Private banks came under pressure as  depositors withdrew cash.  Curiously, 
exactly the opposite was happening at the Banco de la Nation, where reserve- 
deposit ratios climbed (Table 8.2). Clearly, the public perceived the state bank 
as a “safe haven” for their deposits, perhaps because of its implicit guarantees. 
With reserve ratios falling to 14 percent in the private banks, the emergency 
law permitted some relief as the Banco de la Nacion began rediscounts to the 
private banks to supply them with much-needed cash. 
The implications of this new economic environment for the state bank‘s 
balance sheet after 1914 were dire.  Rediscounting surged as a fraction of all 
banking activity, nonperforming loans started to corrupt the balance sheet in 
a big way, and the capitalization level of the bank was gradually sinking. We 
can estimate how much of a difference the rediscount activity made to bank 
balance sheets by considering a counterfactual experiment. Suppose the Banco 
de la Nacion had not used the emergency powers; then one can recalculate the 













Figure 8.2. Reserve-Deposit Ratios, Actual (with Rediscounts) 
and Counterfactual (without Rediscounts), 1892-1934 
-  Banco de la Naci6n - Actual  -  Banco de la Nacion - Counterfactual 
-Other  Banks - Actual 
-Other  Banks - Counterfactual 
1890  1900  1910  1920  1930 
Notes andsources: SeeTable 8.1. 
swap; that is, with cash reserves equal to the rediscounts added to the Banco de 
la Nacion's portfolio, and with the same cash subtracted from the private banks' 
portfolios. 
The  impacts are striking when seen in Figure 8.2. For example, in the 1913- 
14 crisis, absent the rediscount provision, the private banks would have seen 
their reserve-deposit ratio fall under 10 percent, and dangerously close to total 
illiquidity at zero. The  calamitous situation did abate as the Argentine economy 
recovered after 1914, but further deterioration in balance sheets came about in 
the 1920s. Even with rediscounts, private banks saw reserve ratios slide from 
around 25 percent in 1920 to about 10 percent in 1930. The counterfactual 
calculation hints at the shocking implication that, without the actions of the 
Banco de la Nacion, the private banks would have failed under a total collapse 
of liquidity in the early 1930s. Clearly, the rediscount law as it applied to the 
Banco de la Nacion helped a wounded banking system limp along for many 
years in the interwar period. 
Such weaknesses had been exposed during the financial crisis of the late 
1880s when a loss of confidence in the banks prompted a massive currency 
substitution by the public. Still, legislators and policymakers took a seemingly 
relaxed view even after this chilling experience. Admittedly, note issue had been Table 8.2.  Selected Banking Ratios, 1892-1 934 
Banking Reserves to Deposits  Banco de la Naci6n Share of 
Banco de la Nacion  Other Banks  Total Loans  Total Deuosits 














































































































































































































1934  0.12  0.12  0.49  0.46 
Notes and sources:  See Table 8.1. Other banks includes Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Ares, 
also partly state-owned, and all domestic and foreign private banks. 174  Straining at the Anchor 
centralized; but in most other respects an overwhelmingly laissez faire attitude 
to the banking sector persisted.’ 
In this atmosphere, at least until the beginning of the First World War, the 
idea of a central bank and more modest plans for regulating and supervising the 
financial system were foreign to the thinking of the monetary authorities not 
to mention the banking community itself.”  Instead, the money and banlung 
system evolved in an ad hoc fashion.  Changes were implemented piecemeal 
through various legislation, notably the emergency law of 1914. The reforms 
of the 1890s nationalized the currency and instituted a firm nominal anchor, 
but the question  remained  then-as  it still does today in many developing 
countries-whether  just the act of macroeconomic and monetary stabilization 
alone can suffice to generate a stable financial environment.  Either through 
choice or neglect, the authorities of the 1892-1914 period appear to have op- 
timistically believed that with the monetary problem solved the banking sector 
would take care of itself. For several decades, their gamble appeared to pay off 
The 1913-14 crisis was an almost fatal blow for the financial system. Luckily, 
the Banco de la Naci6n stood ready to save the day. This is still something of a 
puzzle. We know the Banco de la Nacion did not have an explicit Lender-of- 
Last-Resort mandate. It  was not a true central bank and was given these kinds 
of powers in an ad hoc fashion.  Why was the rediscount law enacted?  And 
why, even then, given its banking objectives, did the Banco de la Nacion take 
on the risks associated with rediscounting to private banks, when the collateral 
took the form of the low-quality assets then sitting on the private banks’balance 
sheets? This we consider an important political economy question.” 
The new rediscounting by the state bank provided a bailout to the private 
banks once, ex post, they realized that a bad state of the world had hit.  In 
essence, they obtained, if not free, then highly subsidized banking insurance 
from a government that had made no such commitment ex ante.  That such 
an inconsistent policy choice should have been made says a good deal about 
the machinations inside the Argentine corridors of power. Rich and powerful 
interests, including officers and shareholders of the banks, desperately needed 
cover from the risks they had taken, the loans that had gone bad.  Some of 
9. There were other institutionalgaps. It  is frustrating for historians that before 1900  theMemorias 
de  Hacienda (Treasury reports) did not systematically include any consolidated monetary and 
banking statistics. 
10. In 1917, President Hip6lito Irigoyen (1916-22)  made a first attempt, through his Minister of 
Finance Doming0 Salaberry, to establish a central bank and outlined a preliminary project, but 
the plan did not meet with the approval of Congress. 
11. In 1914, the capital and reserves of the Banco de la Nacion amounted to 24 percent of loans, 
while the sum of rediscounts to private banks and nonperforming loans were equivalent to 16 
percent of loans-a  difficult, but clearly solvent situation. By 1931, the capitalization fell to 10 
percent of loans; soft rediscounting and nonperforming loans amounted to 24 percent of loans, 
and increased to an all-time high of 29 percent by 1934. On  top of this potentially insolvent 
situation, after 1930 the Banco de la Nacion had systematically overlent to the government, 
with treasury-bill rediscounts exceeding the ceiling of 25 percent of capital. Cartoon 8.1. Efpuchero Salvador. -  Ya esta fa olfapreparada, y pienso safvar la situacidn, echandofe 
dentro fas moratorias,  las economias, elemprktito, y fos  redescuentos. -Pus,  va  a salir muyjaco ef  cafdo, 
poryue todo eso tiene muypoca substancia. (The stew of salvation. [Cook] -The  pot is prepared, and 
I think it will save the situation, I am putting in overdue debts, economies,  loans, and rediscounts. 
[Person] -Then  the stew will be very thin, because all these have very little substance.) 
Notes;  This cartoon expresses doubts about the effectiveness of the Emergency Laws of 1914. 
President Victorino de la Plaza is the cook. 
Source;  Carasy caretas, ano 17, no. 832, September 12, 1914. 176  Straining at the Anchor 
those same loans, we also know from confidential records, were loans to the 
very same officers and shareholders, or to their real or shadow corporations. 
Such activities certainly give the appearance of corrupt banking operations and 
probably would not have occurred under a careful system of regulation and 
supervision.12 
We do not know what it took for the banks to secure this kind of help, but 
get it they did-in  two forms.  The Banco de la Nacion from 1914 to 1935 
did what it could through rediscounts to keep the banks out of an illiquidity 
crisis. Ultimately, in 1935, as part of a political economy solution worked out by 
the government and its new central bank, the banks got the final bailout they 
sought to head off an insolvency crisis arising from decades of bad loans-a 
solution with high social costs that we consider below. 
In considering the nature of these rescues, we should also mention the in- 
formation asymmetries that made the ongoing liquidity provision by the state 
bank in the 1910s and 1920s a bigger bailout than the simple rediscount figures 
alone suggest. The private banks were trying to offload risks to the state bank. 
Ideally, the risks they would offload first would be the bad ones. This would 
likely be private information for them, unknown to the state bank. That  is, there 
was a “market for lemons” problem in the use of loans as collateral whereby pri- 
vate banks have an incentive to use as collateral the worst paper they h01d.I~ 
This problem of adverse selection continually weakened the balance sheet of 
the Banco de la Nacion. 
In the end, if the rediscounts themselves went bad-as  they were declared to 
be in the 1935 bailout-the  bad collateral would end up on the state balance 
sheet. In  this way, we see that the system was evolving toward a central banking 
idea in a very incoherent manner. In its rediscounting actions the Banco de la 
Nacion was not engaged in pure Lender-of-Last-Resort  actions, like a true cen- 
tral bank following Bagehot’s principle of lending freely at a penalty rate. Such 
actions would have left the bad loans with the private banks while extending 
temporary liquidity. Instead, the state bank was offering a much sweeter, and 
therefore more risky deal. It allowed the private banks to shed their risks, with 
ex post (and possibly ex ante) bad paper used as collateral, and lent them cash 
at only 4.5 percent-far  below even the rate the Banco de la Naci6n offered its 
customers on time deposits! 
Changes in the banking environment in 1913-14, and the interaction be- 
tween the state and private banks, marked the birth of a severe moral hazard 
problem for the money and banking regime in Argentina.  During the Baring 
Crisis many banks had been allowed to fail, even very large banks like the Banco 
12. The source for this information is the confidential reports of the Instituto Movilizador de 
Inversiones Bancarias (IMIB), the body appointed in 1935 by the Central Bank to “clean up” 
the rotten assets of the banking sector. We discuss the activities of the IMIB in a later section. 
13. On  the “lemons”  problem, see Akerlof (1970). Bailing Out  177 
de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. No Lender-of-Last-Resort  actions had been 
taken by the monetary authorities-since  no unified monetary authority had 
then existed. Banking insurance arrived later, in an ad hoc manner, and quite 
possibly through nefarious means. It  was later taken up by the central bank after 
1935,  generating over the decades since a series of financial sector bailouts, paid 
for out of seigniorage in times of high inflation, and whose real social costs, like 
that of the 1935 rescue, have been carefully guarded. 
A Model of Fractional Banks in a Gold Standard Regime 
As may already be apparent, there were widening tensions during the 1920s 
between the goals of external and internal convertibility in the Argentine case. 
During the suspension Argentina had managed the trilemma by allowing a 
float of the exchange rate, keeping open the option to move capital and have 
an activist monetary policy. 
The activist monetary policy could obviously not emanate from the Conver- 
sion Office, which, as we have noted, did not deviate from its mandate to match 
note issues by gold on the margin. Activism was emerging, however, in the new 
workings of the Banco de la Nacion, which now engaged in large rediscount 
operations-a  policy that amounted to setting a lending rate to the other pri- 
vate banks, a nominal target. Upon resumption of the gold standard, however, 
the Conversion Office would be aiming to set the exchange rate-potentially 
a second nominal target, an inconsistency under an open capital market, and a 
possible source of external drain in a bad state of nature. 
The second inconsistency, and the focus of this section, was  the internal 
problem of drain from the banking system. A fractional reserve system allows 
agents to convert deposits into cash on demand.I4 The problem is that this is 
not sustainable in the event of one or more sufficiently bad shocks that create a 
run, or internal drain. Unlike a central bank, the Banco de la Naci6n could not 
bail itself out by issuing currency to itself-it  could only get itself bailed out 
by the Conversion Office, which could, by resort to its emergency rediscount 
provision, issue currency not backed by gold. 
This is our view of events in the 1900-1914  and 1927-29  gold standard 
regimes.  Agents perceived an implicit unified balance sheet of the two state 
institutions,  the Conversion Office and the Banco de la Nacion.  Thus the 
dynamics of outside and inside money were to be inextricably linked, and the 
health of each institution depended on the behavior of the other. The  way we 
approach modeling these dynamics is through the dual-equilibrium version of 
the Dornbusch-Frenkel (1984) model already mentioned. 
14. Thus we think it no surprise that Salama (1997) finds a correlation of gold stocks and the 
Banco de la Naci6n reserve-deposit ratio. This  just describes the process oflinked internal and 
external drains, and in our model we put quite a different interpretation on this phenomenon. 178  Straining at  the Anchor 
In the model, the Conversion Office has a balance sheet that consists of lia- 
bilities in the form of circulating notes MB (high-powered money or monetary 
base), and assets comprised of gold G and securities S. Here S consists of the 
balance sheet counterpart fixed fiduciary issue, the virtual assets that offset the 
unbacked notes in circulation. Here, MB = G + S. The Banco de la Nacibn, 
the state bank, has a balance sheet with liabilities comprised ofbanking deposits 
both private D and public D’  ,  and assets in the form of note reserves R (vault 
cash) and loans L. Here, R +  L = D +  D’. The financial model hinges on an 
appropriate specification of money demand. Consider the broad money stock 
M,  consisting of currency in the hands of the public plus private deposits at 
banks. Then, it is easy to verify that, 
l+c  M=- 
c +  ra! (G  +  S) = m(c,  r)(G  +  S),  (8.1) 
where m(c,  r)  = (l+c)/(c+ra!) is themoneymultiplier,a = (D+D’)/D  is the 
ratio of total to private deposits, Y =  R/(D+  D’) is the reserve-to-total-deposit 
ratio of the bank, and c = (MB -  R)/D  is the currency-to-private-deposit 
ratio of the (nonbank) public. Clearly, amlay < 0 and we can also assume that 
am/& < 0,  since ra! = R/D  < 1  in the empirically relevant range.” 
The currency-to-private-deposit  ratio  c  desired by the public is  now as- 
sumed to depend on how banks behave, specifically through the reserve-to- 
total-deposit  ratio r chosen by the bank.  A higher reserve ratio at the bank 
inspires confidence and leads to a lower demand for currency, so that c =  c(T), 
where c’  < 0. We  can then write broad money M as 
M = &(r)(G  + S), 
where &(r)  = m(c(r),  r). 
Note that the relationship of the multiplier to the reserve-to-total-deposit 
ratio r is ambiguous: &(r) < 0 and &’(r) > 0 are both possible andwe consider 
this in a moment.  Money market equilibrium will generate  an equilibrium 
interest rate such that 
(8.2) 
m(r)(G  +  S) =  L(i,y),  (8.3) 
where Li < 0, L, > 0. Supposing that outputy remains exogenous in the short 
run, we can solve for the interest rate 
i = i(r,  G;  . .  .),  (8.4) 
15. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for the derivation.  Following Dornbusch and Frenkel 
(1984),  we are ignoring here the role of other private banks. That is, we treat the Banco de la 
Nacion, which already accounted for 50 percent of the banking sector by the 19305, as a proxy 
for the entire system.  However, an alternative view would be to integrate the balance sheets 
of the Banco de la Nacion and the private banks and study the dynamics of the entire system. 
This is justified,  if, as actually happened, the private banks have an implicit insurance guarantee 
from the state bank. We repeated the exercise with this aggregation of all the banks and the 
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where ic  < 0. 
We introduce dynamics as follows. Bank policy is assumed to be driven by a 
desired reserve-deposit ratio T(i),  where F is a decreasing function of the interest 
rate i.  Here, better lending opportunities lead the bank to reduce the liquidity 
of its balance sheet in a prudent way so as to seek profits.  Still, the bank is 
cautious, so the actual adjustment of Y  to its target level F is posited to be a 
partial adjustment process, as the bank updates its portfolio position in light of 
new information, such that 
i- = u(T(i) -  Y), 
where  F’ < 0 and  u  is  a positive adjustment-speed  parameter.  Finally, this 
being a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate, we assume a rate of 
gold inflow that is driven by deviations of the local interest rate i  from the world 
rate i*. Thus, 
G = G(i -  i*; .  . .),  (8.6) 
(8.5) 
where G; > 0. 
We now have a dynamical system in two variables,  Y and G. To figure out the 
nature of the dynamics we consider the multiplier again. The  money multiplier 
m reacts to the reserve-deposit ratio Y in two  ways.  A rise in the ratio means 
more use of notes by the bank as reserve, directly lowering the multiplier. It  also 
means more confidence in the bank, lowering the currency deposit ratio c(r) 
and increasing the multiplier via c. If the first effect dominates, then &’(Y)  < 0, 
and we will show that a stable equilibrium obtains (case one). However, if the 
second effect dominates an unstable equilibrium obtains, and it is clear why: 
when 2(r)  > 0 a bank run would lower r,  diminish confidence, raise c (the 
flight to cash), and further lower m,  perpetuating the run (case two). 
Next, we can look at the interest rate equation based on money demand. In 
case one, i, > 0,  and an increase in the reserve-deposit ratio by the bank tightens 
the money market, and lures the public back into holding money balances. In 
case two, i,  < 0,  and such actions do not attract the public to money. That is, 
under case two, the internal convertibility problem overwhelms the system and 
the interest-rate defense will fail. 
The above dynamics lead to a phase diagram in (G, r)-space  as  shown in 
Figure 8.3. The  direction of trajectories is marked in the various regions delin- 
eated by the curves drldt = 0 and dG/dt =  0. The intersections of the curves 
are the two potential kinds of equilibria, labeled El and E2.  The point El 
corresponds to case one and is a stable node, a “good” equilibrium. The point 
E2 corresponds to case two and is an unstable saddle point, a “bad” equilibrium. 
A possible stable saddle path for E2 is shown as SS’ and it is important to 
note that this curve delineates two  regions in the plane:  above SS’, all paths 
lead to the stable equilibrium, the sink point  at El.  Here, the money and Figure 8.3. Phase Diagram for the Dynamic Model 
Reserve-Deposit Ratio 







Path to collapse after pollution of banhnp 
system during suspension of convertibility 
Notes: See text. Builing Out  181 
banking regime is stable and sustainable in the long run. But below SS'  there 
is an unstable regime where all paths lead to collapse. Note that this will not 
generate a crisis in the form of a complete drain of the gold stock-an  external 
convertibility crisis-since  the dynamics of G in the unstable region are such 
as to take paths away from G = 0.  Rather, it is a region in which the bank 
collapses-that  is, an internal convertibility crisis." 
We  think this theoretical framework is ideal for the purpose of studying the 
dynamics of internal and external convertibility in the Argentine case. More- 
over, we  conceive of the model applying in very different ways  in the  two 
periods of convertibility. We have already outlined the major developments in 
the banking system from 1900  to 1935  in the previous section, and, particularly, 
the drastic changes at the Banco de la Nacion after 1914. 
The  Banco de la Naci6n was once a very conservative bank with high reserve 
ratios and a quasi-narrow objective, but after  1914 it increasingly became a 
prop to the private baking system and, as a result, its own balance sheet became 
polluted by the problems of the wider financial system.  Reserve ratios fell 
and the quality of the balance sheet deteriorated. Following resumption of the 
gold standard in December 1927, the bank experienced a severe drain unlike 
anything seen before. How could a system that had once worked so well under 
the old prewar gold standard now fail so miserably? 
Our model supplies an answer. The evidence suggests to us that during the 
Argentine Belle Epoque prior to the First World War, the money and banking 
system was operating in the stable zone of the phase diagram, in the vicinity 
of the stable equilibrium El,  with high confidence in the regime sustained by 
high reserve ratios. 
Evidence for this type ofstable regime is supplied inTable 8.3. We  have high- 
frequency (monthly) data on the gold stocks of the Conversion Office and the 
reserve and deposit holdings of the bank starting in 1908,  and this permits us 
to estimate a locally linearized version of the model close to El.  To empirically 
fit the dynamical system we set up a two-equation vector autoregression (VAR) 
for the reserve ratio and gold stock of the form 
and estimated the model using series from January 1908 to December 1913, 
the heyday of the classical gold standard. 
16. In case one, both curves are upward sloping; the curve dG/dt = 0 is steeper, since the interest 
rate is constant on this curve for external equilibrium;  on the dr/dt =  0 curve the interest rate 
is rising to the lower-left to maintain equilibrium at the bank.  In case two, both curves are 
downward sloping; dG/dt = 0 is again steeper, with the interest rate constant; on dr/dt = 0 
the interest rate is rising to the upper-left to maintain equilibrium at the bank. By inspection 
El is seen to be stable (consider, for example, any small rectangle around El aligned to the 
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Table 8.3. Dynamics of  Internaland External Convertibility, 1908-13 
A. VAR Estimation 
Dependent Variable  Ar  A log G 
r(t -1)  -0.23  0.03 
(0.08)  (0.04) 
log G (t  -1) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Mean of Dependent Variable 













Durbin-Watson Statistic  2.20  1.77 
0.00207  0.00009 
0.00009  0.00044 
B. Covariance  Matrix of  Residuafs 
C. Stubifity Test 
Determinant  0.03 
Trace  -0.33 
Notes andsources: See Appendix 1. Lag selection by step-down procedure. Lag of A log G used 
in second equation, not shown.  Constant terms not shown.  log G is  subject to preliminary 
detrending. See text. 
After careful model selection we found some simple dynamics consistent with 
a stable equilibrium of the type El, and requiring only a simple lag structure, 
p  = g = 1.’’ Entries in the matrix a1  should be  negative on the diagonal, 
and positive off the diagonal and this hypothesis cannot be rejected.I8 Stability 
would also require that (111 should have a positive determinant  and negative 
trace, conditions that are met. 
Apparently the dynamics were stable in this period, and the same impression 
obtains from an inspection of the time series of r and log G (the  latter detrended) 
shown in the upper right portion of Figure 8.4. The resemblance to the stable 
equilibrium El  depicted in Figure 8.3 is striking. At high levels of reserves and 
gold, the system was subject to shocks but remained in a neighborhood of its 
equilibrium. The trajectory fluctuated but it did not explode unidirectionally.” 
17. Preliminary lag choices were made using the Schwarz criterion on univariate series.  Final 
lag selection was made in the VAR  using a step-down  procedure to eliminate insignificant 
lags  of each variable.  One lag of each level variable was required, plus one lag of AG in 
the G equation.  To  filter out the long-run expansion of the gold stock, log G was subject to 
preliminary detrending. 
18. One off-diagonal term has the wrong sign but is not significant. 
19. Unit root tests suggest that both series are stationary in this sample period. We used the more 
powerful GLS  variant method of the Dickey-Fuller test as introduced by Elliott, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996); the exact test we used is the DF-GLS,  test of Elliott (1999). For the series 
r  (demeaned) and log G (detrended) the test statistics were -2.42  (with a 10 percent critical 
value of -2.46),  and -2.68  (critical value -2.41),  respectively. Bailing Out  183 
Figure 8.4.  Reserve Ratios and Gold Stocks in Two Convertible Regimes 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5 
Gold Stock at Conversion Office (log G, detrended) 
Notes: The series log G is detrended and both series are renormalized for clarity.  Sources. 
See Appendix 1. 
That is, the gold standard system was a stable one at the beginning of the 
century because it was combined with prudent inside-money practices. 
This regime ended in 1914:  external shocks and domestic policy choices 
made gradual, seemingly innocuous, changes in the institutional framework. 
The gold standard was suspended, albeit with the intention of resuming. The 
rediscount provisions of the Banco de la Nacion and the Conversion Office 
introduced some implicit guarantees into the financial system, albeit they were 
intended as emergency powers. The notion of acting like a central bank became 
a distinct possibility, at least for the Banco de la Nacion, now that some Lender- 
of-Last-Resort  functions were authorized.  The creation of these powers did 
increase the scope for moral hazard. To its credit, the Conversion Office kept 
its emergency powers largely in reserve. It was not so at the Banco de la Nation, 
where rediscounting grew steadily after 1914,  as a narrow banking orientation 
gave way to expanding commercial activities. 
Had the institutional framework not changed after 1914-had  the gold stan- 184  Straining at the Anchor 
dard rules endured at the Conversion Office and had the bank followed its 
high-reputation  rules-then,  of course, the system would have been locked 
into the stable dynamics for the long run.  However, suspension of the pre- 
vailing institutions in 1914 caused the system to be buffeted by new political 
and economic pressures, allowing it to follow a new path without reference to 
the above dynamical system whose operation had been halted for a time. The 
system moved ever further from the stable equilibrium El. 
The pollution of the balance sheet of the Banco de la Naci6n from 1914 
to 1927 is represented in Figure 8.3 by the line El-P. Outside money was in 
good health, gold stocks in the Conversion Office held firm or even rose, and 
G did not drop. At the same time, inside money fell into very poor health as 
the reserve ratio r declined sharply. Thus, we argue, the system arrived at a 
point like P by the late 1920s. The system could “safely”  cross into the unstable 
region of the phase diagram during the years of suspension, since the dynamics 
of the model were held in check and the tensions kept at bay. 
Yet the institutional pollution of the banking sector, while not a cause for 
serious concern in  the relatively controlled environment  of 1914-27,  could 
potentially unleash a dramatic crisis once the full open-economy gold-standard 
dynamics  were set in motion again. Resumption had always been the authorities’ 
intent along the way, despite their tolerance for the dangerous inconsistencies 
emerging between inside and outside money in the interim.  The dynamical 
system set to work again during the brief 1927-29  resumption, but this time, 
we conjecture, from new initial conditions at a point like P, with movement 
along a path like PP’. 
How would the system behave in this new region according to theory? Ini- 
tially, but not for long, the banking system might appear healthy with a slight 
increase in reserve ratios (r  rising), even as gold losses set in (G falling). Yet, 
eventually, an internal drain would inevitably arise (to the left of the dr/dt = 0 
curve). The system would head toward collapse on the horizontal axis at P’, 
unless the dynamics were terminated by some form of institutional change. Ei- 
ther there could be a suspension of internal convertibility such as a bank closure, 
failure, or “holiday”;  or, there could be a suspension of external convertibility, as 
actually happened when Argentina left the gold standard for good in December 
1929. 
We  have insufficient monthly data to estimate a VAR for this brief period, so 
we cannot subject the system to the same kinds of tests we did in Table 8.3 for 
the pre-1914 regime.2O  However, unit root tests confirm an explosive path for r 
20. We also note that a VAR might be inappropriate in its linear specification for describing a path 
like PP’ that lies so far from the equilibrium E2 where a linear approximation might be valid. 
So it was no surprise that when we did estimate a VAR it did not fit well: we did find unstable 
saddle characteristics, but with signs that did not conform exactly to the prescriptions of the 
partial derivatives of the model. Cartoon 8.2. El miedo no es  zonzo.  El comercio -  iAnimate y sal de  una vez, que me estas haciendo 
mucba falta!  El oro -  Hasta gue  no se vayan esos  de  ahi, no cuentes conmigo;  no guiero suiir una 
depreciarih  (Fear is not stupid. Business -  Get moving and get out now, I badly need you! Gold 
-  As long as they [the combatants of the First World War] are still here, don’t count on me; I 
don’t want to suffer a depreciation.) 
Notes; One month after the outbreak of the First World War, convertibility has been suspended. 
Business wants liquidity, but under the orthodoxy of the currency board, there is no relief forth- 
coming: there could be no attempt to expand monetary policy. 
Source:  Carasy caretas, no.  835, September 26, 1914. 186  Straining at the Anchor 
and log G in this period, with both collapsing, and a cursory inspection of the 
trajectory in the lower left portion of Figure 8.4 illustrates a trajectory much 
like the putative path PP’  shown in Figure 8.3.  Again, the correspondence 
between the empirical trajectories and the phase diagram is striking. 
To sum up, during the Belle Epoque era before 1914, a credible currency 
board and a quasi-narrow state bank avoided any clash between internal and 
external convertibility, making the provision of each that much more secure. 
An external shock, internal economic problems, and new political directions 
after 1914 allowed for some seemingly innocent tinkering with this supposedly 
solid institutional design.  On the surface, the system that existed in 1927-29 
did look, to all intents and purposes, very much like the one that had worked so 
well up to 1913. But certain crucial elements had been allowed to change, and 
the banking sector, including the state bank, had fallen into very poor shape. 
Agents clearly knew this, and when the gold window opened there com- 
menced a massive internal drain (a run on bank deposits) which fed an equally 
massive external drain (a run on gold at the currency board).  The drain was 
halted by the Conversion Office going off gold after an embarrassingly brief 
Outside money was hit hard:  gold losses were large, about 40 
percent below trend in two  years. Inside money was devastated: the Banco de 
la Nacion was now in the same parlous state as the private banks, with a reserve 
ratio falling about 20 percentage points toward a feeble 10 percent level?’ 
Inconvertible  Again: Costs and Benefits 
The suspension of convertibility brought both costs and benefits for Argentina. 
On  the upside, a new freedom in monetary policy allowed domestic prices to 
be delinked from a deflationary global scenario that was to drag many other 
economies into much deeper depressions. However, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, this monetary policy freedom was not automatic and faced several insti- 
tutional hurdles and required some explicit choices to be made about reputation 
and credibility in the fiscal-monetary nexus. 
In a nutshell, Argentina  still had to export gold to service debt, but this 
would mean severe monetary contraction. The choice was either to default on 
external loans or offset the monetary contraction by printing unbacked notes. 
Invoking emergency conditions, a sterilization policy was implemented, and a 
stable price level and money stock were more or less maintained.  As we shall 
21. Had the conversion office  not suspended, the internal  drain could have  continued  to feed 
the external drain and this could have precipitated a speculative attack and a collapse of the 
exchange rate regime. See Miller (1996). 
22. See Figure 8.2 for these trends. The reserve ratio was disastrously low: for some perspective, 
we should recall that, as bad as the run on the banks had been in the Baring Crisis, the reserve 
ratio at the private banks (including the then Banco Nacional) never fell below 22 percent in 
189G91. See Table 3.1. Bailing Out  187 
see in the next chapter, such actions successfully steered Argentina away from 
a severe recession. 
On the downside, the exchange rate was soon floating far from parity after 
such a change of regime. Put another way, the paper peso price of gold soared. 
Valued  at the market rate, the government’s gold reserve was  expanding in 
paper terms. It  could have been very tempting to imagine uses for these sudden 
seigniorage profits, and the policymakers of the time did not lack imagination. 
Most worryingly, the costly financial sector debacle was not over. The sus- 
pension of 1929  had resolved the tensions in the system by halting the prevailing 
rules of the game so as to end the unstable dynamics; but it left a much larger 
problem to be resolved in the longer run. What could be done with a financial 
system that was on the verge of ruin? Who  would bear the costs of fixing the 
damage?  And how big were those costs going to be? We take up this story 
again when we discuss the formation of the central bank and the extraordinary 
use of vast seigniorage resources to benefit a privileged few by bailing out the 
very large fraction of rotten assets that had accumulated on the balance sheets 
of the nation’s private banks. 